Are young men really returning to church? The data says not so fast

In the sociology of religion, it’s hard to “know” things with certainty. Many findings are fairly consistent, but almost all of them come with caveats. Still, one result from large-scale quantitative research has held up remarkably well: men are almost never more religious than women. In 2016, the Pew Research Center conducted an analysis of religiosity across over 190 countries and came to exactly that conclusion. In about a third of these countries, women were clearly more religious; in the rest, the gender gap was statistically indeterminate.

In the countries where a gender gap did emerge, one feature stood out—they were predominantly Christian. As the Pew report notes, “across all measures of religious commitment, Christian women are more religious than Christian men, often by considerable margins.” Whether the measure was frequency of prayer, religious importance, or worship attendance, Christian women consistently outpaced Christian men.

Explaining this gap is another matter entirely. One paper even described it as “a genuine scientific puzzle.” Rodney Stark famously argued that the answer was biological, claiming that men’s higher testosterone levels push them toward risk-seeking behaviors—traits he believed were at odds with religious devotion. Others counter that the explanation lies in socialization rather than biology. For example, a classic 1980s study argued that women’s lower labor-force participation gave them both more time and greater need for social connection, which religious communities provide. Norris and Inglehart make a similar case, suggesting that women’s comparatively lower levels of existential security lead them to seek the “safety net” offered by religious groups.

Against this longstanding backdrop, a wave of recent headlines has captured public attention. In September 2024, the New York Times ran a story titled, “In a First Among Christians, Young Men Are More Religious Than Young Women”. Just weeks ago, the same reporter, Ruth Graham, published a lengthy piece on the rise of Orthodox Christian converts, noting that Orthodoxy is attracting “energetic new adherents, especially among conservative young men.”

Is it possible, then, that the long-held assumption about Christian gender gaps is being overturned by a surge of Gen Z men returning to church? There’s certainly no shortage of media stories—see examples here, here, and here—suggesting a religious revival concentrated among young men.

Statistically, the evidence is suggestive rather than definitive. Pew’s 2025 Religious Landscape Study reported that, while the gender gap appears to be narrowing, “there are still no birth cohorts in which men are significantly more religious than women.” The language is careful but clear: something may be shifting among Gen Z, but it’s far too soon to declare a reversal of a decades-long trend.

As Greg Smith from Pew notes in a more recent report, “And, to be sure, there are some interesting things happening with religion among young people.

For example, young men are now about as religious as women in the same age group. That’s a notable change from the past, when young women tended to be more religious than young men. It also differs from the pattern seen among older people today: Older women are much more religious than older men.

However, this narrowing of the gender gap is driven by declining religiousness among American women. It is not a result of increases in the religiousness of men.”

This echoes my analysis of religious attendance across three major U.S. surveys—the Cooperative Election Study, the General Social Survey, as well as the Pew survey. Looking across all three datasets, I see no convincing evidence that young men attend religious services at higher rates than young women.

Figure 1

However, when I look at the data across all three surveys, I find that among adults born in the 1990s and early 2000s, there is no meaningful difference in weekly religious attendance between men and women. You can always uncover a stray result suggesting one gender is slightly more religious than the other, or is rising among one particular demographic, but viewed in aggregate, there is simply no evidence of a dramatic resurgence in churchgoing among Gen Z men.

Additionally, when it comes to the share of young people who identify as non-religious, there’s nothing definitive that emerges from the data. For instance, among men born in the early 2000s, the share who identify as non-religious is 41%. For young women from the same birth cohort, it’s 43%. That difference is not statistically significant.

Methodologically, this kind of analysis is unusually challenging. Many survey firms have shifted to more cost-efficient opt-in sampling designs, which have been shown to produce less reliable estimates for young adults. Compounding that problem is basic statistics: most surveys don’t include a large enough sample of Gen Z respondents to generate precise estimates. Small samples mean large margins of error, making firm conclusions nearly impossible.

For that reason, at the macro level, we simply cannot make a definitive claim about a supposed religious revival among Gen Z men. But other data does suggest a broader “vibe shift” around religion itself. In a Pew poll from February 2024, only 18% of Americans said religion was gaining influence in American life. When the same question was fielded a year later, that share had risen to 31%.

This points to a growing perception that religion is resurging—especially after decades of rapid secularization. The recent leveling off of levels of religiosity after a long decline which I’ve written about here, may have created fertile ground for talk of a revival. But this shift in perception does not indicate a measurable return to religion among Gen Z men or any other specific demographic group.

What the data does show, however, is that young men tend to hold more traditionally conservative views on social issues than women their age. In the Pew Religious Landscape Study, respondents were asked to evaluate statements such as “acceptance of transgender people is a positive change” and “homosexuality should be accepted by society.” Across these items, a consistent gender gap emerges: men, regardless of birth cohort, are less socially progressive than women from the same generation.

Figure 2

What stands out in these results, though, is that the gender gap is much wider among the youngest adults than among their parents’ or grandparents’ generations. Take the question of transgender acceptance: among people born in the 1970s, women are seven points more supportive than men. But among respondents born in the 2000s, the gap jumps to sixteen points. On whether homosexuality should be accepted by society, the gender gap among those born in the 1980s is just four points. For those born in the first half of the 2000s, it’s a staggering seventeen points. It’s also noteworthy that on same-sex marriage and the acceptability of homosexuality, men born in the 2000s are less liberal than men born in the 1990s. There are some similar tentative signs with regard to attitudes towards abortion, as shown in work with the American National Election Studies (ANES) by AIBM collaborator Allen Downey.

Could this be some indirect evidence that young men are more influenced by social-issue messaging coming from religious groups? Possibly. It’s difficult to construct an alternative explanation for such a large divergence without bringing religion into the picture at some level. Still, this may point more to a receptivity to religiously inflected arguments among young men than to any increase in actual churchgoing behavior.

As academics often say—we need more time and more data. I suspect the next five years of survey results will significantly clarify the trajectories of young men and women when it comes to religion. As their lives stabilize, they settle into careers, and some begin to marry and start families, we will get a much clearer sense of whether religion is actually taking hold. If a shift is coming, these next few years will be decisive.

Ryan Burge

Ryan Burge is a professor of practice at the John C. Danforth Center at Washington University in St. Louis and a political scientist who studies religion in American public life, with analysis featured in major national outlets.