What’s really going on with men and work? Seven facts

2. Aging and schooling explain a large part of the recent decline, but not all of it

Metric: LFP, NEET
Population: Men by age
Time horizon: 2000-2025

Young men have seen some of the largest declines in labor force participation from 2000 to 2025. But much of that reflects delayed labor-market entry: more young men are enrolled in school, and students are less likely to work. This can be seen by looking at the share of men either working or in school: in 1990 it was 90%, rising to 91% in 2000 and then declining to 88% by 2025.

Figure 2

Prime-age men, by contrast, have seen much smaller declines over the past 25 years, and participation rates among older men have slightly increased.

Figure 3

At the same time, the United States population as a whole has grown older, and older men despite their higher rates of employment compared to the past are still less likely to work than prime-age men.

Male labor force participation has fallen from 75% in 2000 to 68% in 2025, a 7 percentage-point decline. To understand the impact of an aging workforce, figure 4 holds the age distribution of men 16 or older at its 2000 level and lets within-age participation rates evolve as they actually did. If the age distribution had remained what it was in 2000, today’s LFP would be about 73% instead of 68%, a decline of 2 percentage-points rather than 7. The 5-point gap between the two lines is the share of the decline attributable to population aging.

Figure 4

4. Demand for non-college male labor has weakened

Metric: Not In Labor Force (NILF)
Population: Prime-age men
Time horizon: 1995-2026

Prime-age men are most likely to report being out of the labor force due to illness and disability, though this has become slightly less common over the past 30 years. Caretaking, school, and retirement, in contrast, have become more common.

Figure 6

These responses can tell us something about how men describe their current status, but they do not necessarily tell us what pushed them out of work in the first place. Disability, for instance, may be the reason someone gives for not working, but it may also be more likely among men who have already lost work for other reasons.

For the post-2000 period, the strongest explanations beyond aging are demand-side changes that reduced opportunities for non-college men, especially import competition and automation. Other factors—such as expanded disability compensation, increased rates of incarceration, and rising minimum wages—are smaller, but still measurable, contributors. Opioids, changing norms around work, and improvements in leisure technology may also matter but are harder to quantify, and there is less consensus on their impact.

6. Young college-educated men are a newer concern

Metric: Unemployment
Population: Young adults, ages 22-27 by education
Time horizon: 1990-2026

Much of the long-run decline in male labor force participation has been concentrated among men without college degrees. But recent unemployment trends also suggest young college-educated men are beginning to experience some stress.

Historically, bachelor’s degrees have provided protection from unemployment—men and women with degrees are less likely to be unemployed than those without. But the figure below shows that this has changed over the last 5-10 years. Between 1990 and 2015, young men and women (22-27) with at least a bachelor’s degree experienced lower unemployment on average. However, more recently their unemployment rates have risen, and for young college-educated men in particular, now approach the unemployment rate of men without bachelor’s degrees.

Figure 8

Conclusion

Underneath the broad and long-term decline in male labor force participation, several stories are unfolding at once. Some are demographic: the male population has grown older, and older men remain less likely to work than prime-age men. Some reflect shifting societal expectations around education: more young men are spending time in school, and fewer combine school with work.

But that does not mean there is no reason for concern. Prime-age participation has been relatively stable overall, yet the long-run decline among non-college men is substantial. Even if the broader story among young men is not one of wholesale withdrawal, a growing subset of young men appear increasingly detached: the share who are not in school, not employed, and not seeking work has doubled since 1990. More recently, young college-educated men are experiencing unusually high unemployment relative to historical patterns, and job growth has been concentrated in sectors where men are underrepresented.

The result is a more nuanced picture than headlines sometimes suggest. Men’s labor-market challenges are real, but they differ by age and education. Some have developed over several decades while others have been more sudden. This makes the story harder to summarize, but it also brings potential solutions into sharper relief—effective solutions are likely to be those that help non-college men access stable career paths, improve school-to-work transitions for young men, and encourage more men into growing sectors such as health, education, and care.